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Reforming the banking sector in the post-communist region
Following the collapse of the Soviet bloc in the early 1990s, the policy-makers in post-
communist countries could no longer rely on the economic practices used in the socialist planned
economies and had to adapt to the rules of the game in a market economy framework. In order to
be successful in the new economic environment, the production, investment, and management
strategies of the government and the emerging private actors had to be very different from those
used during the past five decades. One fundamental challenge was to reduce the involvement of
the state in economic affairs and, consequently, bring the existing policies in line with the new
economic environment. In the early 1990s, the newly elected parliaments across the region were
engaged in a process of “policy updating” in areas as diverse as human rights, culture, and
enterprise management.
The banking sector is one pivotal piece of the puzzle of economic restructuring after the
fall of communism, because it provides vital financial resources for the existing as well as the
new economic actors. Across the region, the emerging small private businesses in sectors such as
retail, food processing, and textiles, as well as the restructuring state-owned conglomerates in
sectors such as the chemical industry, metallurgical industry, and electronics need access to
financial resources in order to buy new equipment, renovate the infrastructure where the
production processes take place, and invest in research and development. This is one important
reason why a strong financial sector that can provide efficient and reliable banking services is a
must in a market economy.
Introducing market logic in the operation of the banking sector can be beneficial,
especially when a country transitions from a regime with a heavy state involvement in financial
decision-making, as was the case in the post-communist region. A weak banking sector cannot
support the growth and improvement of the industrial and service sectors, which hampers the
development of a functioning market economy. The advantage of a reformed banking sector with
clear rules of the game is that economic actors can engage in meaningful long-term planning and
assume availability of credit products and prompt servicing of their financial accounts (Levine
2002; Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2006). Foreign investors prefer an environment where they can
set up reliable operations; domestic investors prefer to have access to affordable domestic credit
in order to develop their business activities (Marinov and Marinova 2003; Djarova 2004).3
Therefore, political actors have certain incentives to seek good quality banking reforms in order
to promote economic development and growth.
However, the banking sector also provides fertile ground for political interference and
corruption, because influential political figures can provide access to loans and preferential
financing. Therefore, political actors face certain incentives to implement partial banking
reforms, which would give them greater discretionary power in allocating financial resources. An
unreformed banking sector may distort heavily the economic incentives in a country. When the
state holds majority stakes in the most influential banks, the political agenda of the government
can trump the market incentives of the banks. In the post-communist region, there have been
numerous cases when public financial resources were misused for the private benefits of the
influential elites (Hellman 1998; Ganev 2001; Barnes 2003; Hoff and Stiglitz 2004).
There are possible remedies to prevent the misuse of the banks such as implementing
laws that promote transparency in the banks’ operations; laws that allow the Central Bank to
operate independently of short-term political pressures to bail out the government in times of
excessive budget deficit; and institutional mechanisms to monitor the compliance of banks with
the legal rules. The puzzle inspiring my research is: What factors push governments to pursue
good quality banking sector reform?
Dependent variable: Quality of banking sector reform
It is indeed hard to define the components of ‘good’ banking sector reform in absolute
terms. One analytical strategy is to consider the starting point of Eastern European transitions
and the goals of transition. Then we can identify benchmark reforms necessary to achieve those
goals. In Eastern Europe, the transitioning regimes started out with a communist political system
and a planned economy, and the goals of transition were to establish a liberal democracy and a
market economy. In the banking sphere, ‘good’ reforms would provide clear market entry and
exit conditions (Kroszner 1998; Fries 2005); ensure the ability of banks to function according to
market principles, without state intervention in their decision-making (Berglof and Bolton 2001;
Fries 2005); guarantee central bank independence (Cukierman 1992; Eijffinger and De Haan
1996; Maxfield 1998; Maliszewski 2000); and establish independent banking oversight (Nord
2000; Holthausen and Ronde 2003). Those are key policy standards, according to which I will
judge the quality of a country’s banking sector framework at any given time point. My analysis4
relies on a quantitative measure of banking reform developed by the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) that takes into account the policy standards described
above.
How much has the neo-liberal “Washington consensus” policy package influenced the
course of banking reform in the region? Since transitioning in the early 1990s, many post-
communist countries have found themselves in economic turmoil. Balance of payments and
financial crises have been frequent. When post-communist governments approached the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for emergency financing and policy advice, or the World
Bank for strategic loans to upgrade the public infrastructure, they had to take on the obligation to
comply with the policy prescriptions of the so-called “Washington consensus,” which contained
some provisions regarding banking sector laws. With respect to banking sector reform in the
post-communist region, the IMF has been adamant about opening the sector to foreign banks and
introducing more competition, streamlining bankruptcy procedures, strengthening the Central
Bank and bank supervision (Nord 2000; Stone 2002; Pop 2006). Compared to other policy
dimensions of the “Washington consensus” such as across-the-board deregulation and reduction
of public spending, banking reform comes across as less ideologically-driven and more of a
collection of “good practices” used in the advanced industrialized economies.
Explanatory variables: Government coloration, domestic alliances, and conditionality
Domestic and international factors interact to shape the quality of banking sector reform
in transitional countries. I probe two characteristics of the domestic political system that
according to previous research should have a strong impact on the quality of banking reform:
partisan politics and domestic alliances. My analysis draws on the partisan politics literature with
respect to the role of government coloration. I use the literature on hybrid democracies and the
comparative political economy literature on foreign direct investment and trade to understand the
role of domestic alliances. I also test the effect of conditionality programs promoted by the IMF.
The two alternative explanations of banking sector legal reform that I consider are based on
economic development and intrinsic cultural differences.5
Government coloration
A widely recognized finding in the comparative politics literature with respect to partisan
politics in the post-communist area after 1989 is that center-right and reformed communist
governments in power do better in the initiation and implementation of market-liberalizing
economic reforms, compared to their unreformed communist counterparts (Haggard and Webb
1994; Ekiert 1996; Bunce 2000; Grzymala-Busse 2002; Vachudova 2005). Steven Fish (1997)
has demonstrated statistically that countries, where the opposition to communism won the first
elections have performed best in undertaking and sustaining economic reforms after 1989.
Hypothesis 1: We expect a good quality of banking sector reform if the domestic political
process is characterized by right-wing governments or reformed communists in power.
The literature on party politics in advanced industrialized countries assumes low levels of
electoral volatility, relatively high party cohesion, and crystallization of programmatic party
agendas. However, the assumptions about high party cohesion and crystallization of
programmatic parties become questionable once when we move beyond the borders of the
Central European front-runners of transition. As Herbert Kitschelt has pointed out, “the
presumption that political conflict between parties is based on programmatic appeals is generally
problematic for students of non-West-European politics” (1995: 448). Petr Kopecky has
demonstrated in his case study of the Czech Republic that even in political systems where
programmatic parties are prevalent, political parties are rather removed from their grass-root
citizen supporters (1995: 517). Therefore, we need to investigate the input of other organized
interests such as business associations and labor unions into parties’ policy positions. As a
starting point, I consider the findings of the political science and sociology literature that has
underscored the role of economic policy networks in economic restructuring (Stark and Bruszt
1998); the impact of sociopolitical networks on institution building in post-communist countries
(McDermott 2002); and the effect of foreign investors on the evolution of inter-enterprise
networks (Stark and Vedres 2006).6
Domestic alliances
An important domestic determinant of the quality of legal reform that has received less
attention in the literature is the relationship between governing elites and mobilized domestic
stakeholders. By domestic stakeholders I mean organized groups with a salient political or
economic policy position such as business associations, labor unions, non-governmental
organizations, and policy think-tanks. The domestic political process is characterized by the
formation of strategic alliances in order to adopt and implement policy change. The nature and
actual operation of these alliances vary across issue areas.
Joel Hellman (1998) has investigated the economic dynamics of hybrid regimes. He
argues that the most significant threat to consolidating democracy and market economy does not
come from the groups of structural reform ‘losers’ such as pensioners and heavy industry
workers, but from the small group of partial reform ‘winners’ such as corrupt government
officials and managers of state-owned enterprises (Hellman 1998). Branislav Slanchev (2006)
has confirmed statistically this finding. Hellman’s analysis runs contrary to earlier studies of
economic reform in the region. At the outset of the transition process, Przeworski (1991) and
Haggard and Kaufman (1995) argued that the biggest threat to economic reform would come
from reform losers, because the costs of reform are concentrated and the benefits are dispersed.
According to Hellman, the post-communist experience shows that reforms have been
stalled by “enterprise insiders who have become new owners only to strip their firms’ assets;
commercial bankers who have opposed macroeconomic stabilization to preserve their
enormously profitable arbitrage opportunities in distorted financial markets; local officials who
have prevented market entry into their regions to protect their share of local monopoly rents; and
so-called mafiosi who have undermined the creation of a stable legal foundation for the market
economy” (1998: 204). Hellman points out that these actors can hardly be classified as short-
term net losers of economic reform. On the contrary, they were the earliest and biggest winners.
Hypothesis 2: We expect a poor quality of banking reform if the domestic political process is
characterized by an alliance between corrupt elites in power and rent-seeking domestic
stakeholders.7
Scholars of political economy have established that foreign direct investment (FDI) has
affected positively the economic performance of transitional economies in the post-communist
region (Dunning and Narula 1996; Schröder 2001; Marinov and Marinova 2003). From a macro-
economic perspective, FDI helps to cover current account and fiscal deficits. Moreover, FDI
supplements the low domestic resources to finance both ownership change and capital formation.
Compared with other financing options, FDI also facilitates the transfer of technology, know-
how and skills, and helps local enterprises to reach foreign markets (Krkoska 2001).
What is the mechanism through which foreign direct investors influence banking sector
legal reform? Foreign direct investment differs from other types of international capital flows
with respect to the purpose and duration of the commitment that it involves. The purpose of FDI
is to establish lasting commercial relations and to exert a noticeable managerial influence in the
foreign country (Barrell and Holland 2000: 478). Therefore, it is long-term oriented, compared to
shorter-term opportunities such as portfolio investment. Lipschitz, Lane, Mourmouras note that
FDI is the type of foreign investment that is least likely to be withdrawn in response to short-
term market volatility (Lipschitz et al. 2002: 4). The long-term commitment of FDI investors
motivates them to take an active part in the enterprise decision-making process and press the
country’s government for a more transparent and efficient business environment.
A weaker relationship between foreign capital and domestic economic developments
concerns the role of trade. Trade patterns are influenced by considerations about economic
efficiency, comparative advantage, and production costs, so they are not necessarily related to
the country’s legal framework. Scholars of political economy have analyzed the impact of trade
on domestic politics. Axel Haldenius (1992) has argued that exposure to international trade
brings higher rates of economic growth, which in turn fosters political liberalization and a more
democratic and accountable domestic political system. Beck et al. (2001) argue that trade
openness generates pressures for more transparency and efficiency in the domestic financial
sector.
Hypothesis 3: We expect a good quality of banking reform if foreign direct investors have a
strong presence in the country.
Hypothesis 4: We expect a good quality of banking reform if a country has strong trade relations
with advanced industrialized economies.8
Conditionality
The use of conditionality by international actors has received significant attention by
scholars and policy-makers (Mayhew 1998; Schmitter 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier
2004; Vachudova 2005). In general, conditionality entails a package of rewards and
punishments, attached to demands for specific policy changes. With regards to banking sector
reform in the post-communist region, the IMF has demanded provisions that guarantee the
independence of the Central Bank from political pressure; opening the banking sector to foreign
investors and competition; strengthening banking supervision; and improving the bankruptcy legal
framework (Bonin and Wachtel 1999; Berglof and Bolton 2001). The EU has also demanded the
adoption of the banking standards observed in the Union as part of the obligatory pre-accession
transposition of the acquis communautaire.
IMF conditionality was introduced in the 1950s as a way of ensuring that governments do
not squander the financial support provided by the Fund. The IMF offers financial assistance only
on the condition that the respective government agrees to pursue a range of economic stabilization
and adjustment policies that are spelt out in a “letter of intent” document signed by the government
and the Fund (Williamson 1983; Dreher and Vaubel 2003; Bird and Willet 2003). The IMF claims
that its conditionality policies have a positive effect on attracting private capital flows and improving
the stability of the target country’s financial system. The Fund promotes conditionality as a signaling
or commitment device that increases the markets’ confidence in the country and encourages private
market actors to become involved, whereas without conditionality they would have been reluctant to
do so (IMF 2001; Bird and Willet 2003; Edwards 2003).
Hypothesis 5: We expect a good quality of banking reform if a country has been involved
consistently in IMF conditionality programs.
Alternative explanations
What are some plausible alternative explanations of why banking sector legal reform
occurs, or fails to take place, in the post-communist region? In my analysis of banking legal
reform, the policy outcomes result from the interplay of domestic and international actors. This is
an agent-driven account, assuming that foremost strategic considerations motivate the actors
involved in the process of policy change. The most compelling alternative conceptualizations are
structural ones. According to structural accounts, the policy outcomes are driven by the initial9
conditions in which countries find themselves such as their level of economic development, or
fundamental cultural characteristics. According to my argument, even in cases with adverse
initial conditions, good quality banking reform is possible if there is sufficient political will and
mobilized actors ready to carry out the necessary reforms. By contrast, structural accounts would
predict little or no change if the underlying characteristics of the economic and social system
stay the same.
Economic development
Adam Przeworski et al.’s (2000) project examines systematically the relationship
between regime type (democratic or authoritarian) and economic performance. As part of their
analysis, the authors draw conclusions about the relationship between the nature of political and
institutional arrangements and the level of economic development of different countries.
Although Przeworski et al.’s analysis is more sophisticated and nuanced than modernization
theory accounts, in essence, it contends that “poor countries cannot afford a strong state” (2000:
163). According to the authors’ analysis of data since the 1950s, countries with an annual per
capita income below $1,000 have very grim prospects of ever developing economically, and
consequently, institutionally (2000: 162). The scholars detect a more heterogeneous pattern of
economic and institutional development for states with annual per capita incomes between
$1,000 - $2,000 and upper per capita income categories. In these income groups, some countries
such as Singapore, Portugal, and Greece grew economically over time, whereas other countries
remained in the same income category, or descended below the $1,000 boundary (2000: 162).
Even if we accept the argument that very poor states cannot sustain complex political
institutions, the question remains of what factors other than the level of economic development
have shaped the path of institutional change in countries from the heterogeneous income
categories. If we follow the logic of the economic development argument, we should expect
predominantly wealthy countries to have an advanced banking sector framework.
Alternative hypothesis 1: We expect a good quality of banking reform if a country has a high
level of economic development.10
Culture
Although the concept of culture is not easy to capture in quantifiable terms, some
scholars have attempted to study systematically the impact of culture on institutions and
governance. For example, Amir Licht et al. (2006) analyze the rule of law, curbing corruption,
and democratic accountability as part of a general bundle of social norms. The authors identify
seven broad types of world culture and examine the systematic influence of culture type on the
bundle of social norms. The authors find statistical evidence that “national cultural profiles
predict governance outcomes some thirty years later” (2006: 29) and therefore propose that the
direction of causality flows from culture to social norms.
The volume “Culture Matters” edited by Lawrence Harrison and Samuel Huntington
(2000) shares a similar vision of the role of culture in society. As Stace Lindsey emphasizes in
his contribution to the Harrison and Huntington project, “individuals will often accept
intellectual arguments, understand the need to change, and express commitment to changing, but
then resort to what is familiar” (2000: 283). In other words, cultural values matter because they
form the principles around which economic activity is organized. Hence, if we follow the logic
of this project, altering the institutional environment in a country presupposes a change in the
underlying attitudes, beliefs, and assumptions.
Alternative hypothesis 2: We expect a good quality of banking reform if there is an existing
culture that supports the development of market institutions.
Model estimation
This paper uses pooled cross-sectional time series analysis, which allows me to get
leverage on important factors contributing to a good quality of banking reform that vary both
cross-sectionally and over time. Time series analysis also allows me to test the effect of a
broader range of factors on the dependent variable, as the number of observations in my model is
higher than in a single-year ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and this generates more
degrees of freedom in the estimation process (Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 2005).
The units of analysis in my model are twenty-five states in the post-communist region:
the East Central European states, the Baltic states, the South-East European states, and all post-11
Soviet states over a period of eleven years: 1995-2005. From the states of ex-Yugoslavia, I have
excluded Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro from my analysis due to the frequently
missing data. In total, my model has 275 observations. The panel that I use is balanced: it
contains twenty-five countries and observations on each variable for eleven years.
The literature has shown that using OLS estimation techniques on pooled cross-sectional
data violates several regression assumptions, which lowers the size of the standard errors and
artificially increases the significance of the estimated coefficients (Beck and Katz 1995). The
most serious problems are the following: errors in time series data tend to be serially correlated;
errors are likely to show cross-sectional heteroskedasticity such that variances differ across units;
errors may be cross-sectionally correlated as well; errors may reflect causal heterogeneity across
space, time, or both (Ostrom 1978; Sayrs 1989; Hicks 1994; De Boef 2004). Beck and Katz
(1995) recommend using OLS estimation with a lagged dependent variable to correct for the
serial correlation, as well as panel-corrected standard errors.
However, the use of a lagged dependent variable creates problems with respect to the
dialogue between the theories that we want to test and the estimation methods that we employ
(Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 2005). When we include the level of the dependent variable from
the previous year as a control, the analysis essentially turns into a study of annual change.
Usually, the lagged dependent variable becomes the most significant explanatory factor. If we
pursue this analytical strategy, we cannot say much about the role of institutional and political
factors that may be of important theoretical interest. Achen (2000) has demonstrated that a
lagged dependent variable “does bias the substantive coefficients toward negligible values and
does artificially inflate the effect of the lagged dependent variable.”
In my analysis, the year-to-year change in the evaluation of the countries’ banking reform
does not change drastically. Therefore, models that use a lagged dependent variable will have a
unit root: the coefficient of the lagged banking sector evaluation will explain virtually all the
variance in the model (Bradley 2001; Kittel and Obinger 2002). Thus, the lagged dependent
variable washes out the effect of the other independent variables, while substantively it does not
contribute much to the explanation (Nickell 1981; Baltagi 2001). Also, the very interpretation of
the lagged dependent variable is problematic. Because the lagged dependent variable can be
written out as a function of the independent variables, the coefficient of the lagged dependent
variable actually measures the weighted average of the independent variables (Cochrane and12
Orcutt 1949). Hence it is not justified to interpret the lagged dependent variable as a measure of
path dependency or persistency (Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 2005).
In order to be able to test the substantive theoretical propositions outlined earlier in this
paper, I choose not to use the lagged dependent variable approach in my analysis of the quality
of banking sector reform in the post-communist region. Instead, I will correct for the serial
correlation in the data by applying a Prais-Winsten transformation model (AR1) with panel-
corrected standard errors. This method has been advocated by Plümper, Troeger, and Manow
(2005) as an estimation procedure that allows researchers to test substantive theoretical
expectations more accurately than models that employ fixed country effects or a lagged
dependent variable.
The Prais-Winsten transformation model (AR1) is an example of what Judge et al. (1985)
call Estimated Generalized Least Squares (EGLS) models. The goal of the EGLS analytical
approach is to determine the nature of the autoregressive process that generates the errors,
estimate its parameters (in the case of a first-order process AR1 this is a single parameter), then
transform the data and apply an OLS estimation procedure to derive the coefficient estimates
(Ostrom 1978). The Prais-Winsten approach uses conditional maximum likelihood estimation
and incorporates all available observations.
To evaluate the robustness of the coefficient estimates that I obtained from applying a
Prais-Winsten transformation model (AR1) with panel-corrected standard errors, I also re-
estimated the model in two ways. First, I used a technique which provides robust cluster
estimators of the standard errors. This procedure yields correct standard errors in the presence of
any pattern of heteroskedasticity, which is a concern in pooled time series analysis (Bradley and
Stephens, forthcoming). Second, I used an error components time series model, also called a
random coefficients model. This technique estimates the parameters of the distributions of the
different components of the error term to derive efficient and unbiased estimates (Sayrs 1989).
The idea is to break down the error into three separate components resulting from three sources
of variation: variation in the time periods, variation in the cross-sections, and “true” random error
variation (De Boef 2004). The advantage of using the random effects model is that the estimates
will be more efficient. However, if the error variances are correlated with the explanatory
variables, the estimators will be biased. Overall, the two additional estimation techniques13
provided estimates that are in line with the ones obtained from the Prais-Winsten transformation
model.
Before I present and discuss the coefficient estimates, I need to consider the relationships
among the variables included in the model. Appendix I provides a description of the explanatory
variables, the sources of the data, and the measurement scales. Appendix III shows the
correlations among the analyzed variables. By looking at the correlation matrix, we detect a
potential multicollinearity problem for several of the independent variables (the correlation is
above 0.6). I considered incorporating in the analysis institutional capacity variables such as
administrative and judicial capacity. However, because they are highly correlated with the GDP
variable and with each other, I chose not to include them in the final model specification.
Although I have coded for the countries’ participation in EU conditionality programs as
well, I decided to estimate the model only with the measure for IMF program participation for
two main reasons. First, participation in the strictest and most effective EU conditionality
program – the accession process – is highly correlated with the GDP variable, the trade variable,
and the corruption variable, and thus it would probably produce multicollinearity in the
estimation process. Second, the kind of conditionality program that the EU is likely to offer
depends on the target country’s location, degree of political stability, and level of economic
development. For example, it is not reasonable to expect that the EU will offer the accession
conditionality package to the Ukraine, or to stretch this reasoning even further – to Uzbekistan.
Since some countries in the post-communist region by virtue of their geographical location are
not eligible for the strictest and most effective kind of EU conditionality, it becomes difficult to
disentangle the flow of causality between the factors that qualify a country to participate in an
EU conditionality program to begin with, and the independent impact of EU conditionality on
the target country.
In addition, Appendix II shows the results of variance inflation factor analysis of the
explanatory variables. Based on looking at the correlations among the variables and the variance
inflation factor analysis, I have decided not to include the administrative and judicial capacity
variables and the participation in EU conditionality program dummy variables in order to avoid
multicollinearity (their variance inflation factor is above or close to 10).14
Table 1: EGLS regression analysis of banking sector reform in the post-communist region
Explanatory variable Effect pcse
Government coloration
Unreformed left in government
- baseline category -
Reformed left in government 0.142** (0.07)
Liberal/right in government 0.072 (0.06)
Nationalist/personalistic party
in government
0.065 (0.08)
Domestic alliances
Lack of corruption 0.197** (0.09)
Foreign direct investment
(per capita)
0.265*** (0.08)
Percentage trade
with industrialized countries
0.459** (0.22)
Conditionality
No IMF agreement
- baseline category -
Stand-by agreement with IMF 0.109* (0.06)
Poverty relief and growth facility
agreement with IMF
0.124** (0.06)
No IMF program
(and reform front-runner)
0.058 (0.09)
Economic development
Log GDP
(per capita)
0.259*** (0.07)
Percentage of GDP from agriculture 0.238 (0.50)
Culture
Percentage population protestant 0.667** (0.29)
Percentage population muslim - 0.325*** (0.11)
Coding refinement 0.111 (0.07)
Constant 0.253
Adjusted R-squared 0.728
275 observations
AR1 autocorrelation process: rho .704
Note: The table presents estimated generalized least squares (EGLS) unstandardized regression coefficients
obtained by applying a Prais-Winsten transformation model (AR1), with panel-corrected standard errors (pcse) in
parentheses. The significance levels are as follows: *p< 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.0115
The theoretical model presented in this paper fits the data well. The explanatory variables
account for seventy-three percent of the variance in the quality of banking sector reform in the
post-communist region. The positive intercept of 0.253 suggests that there is a ‘good’ banking
reform component common to all countries in the sample.
The empirical analysis supports the theoretical argument developed in the literature
concerning the different impact of reformed left and unreformed left parties in government. For
reformed left parties in government, the intercept is 0.4, compared to 0.25 for the baseline
category: unreformed left parties in government. Having a liberal/right party in government is
also associated with a better quality of banking reform compared to having an unreformed left
party in government, but the result is not statistically significant.
The test of the domestic alliance variables supports Joel Hellman’s (1998) argument
about partial reform in the post-communist region. I use the level of corruption in the political
system as a proxy variable to measure the presence of partial reform alliances that hinder full-
scale economic reform. The analysis shows that the less corruption is present in the domestic
system, the better the quality of banking legal reform. The presence of foreign direct investors is
also a statistically significant predictor of good quality banking legal reform. The last variable
that I use to tap into the impact of alliances is also statistically significant: the more a country
trades with advanced industrialized countries, the better the quality of its banking sector legal
framework. The effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade with advanced industrialized
countries are sizeable. For one unit of increase in inflow of FDI, the quality of banking reform
increases by seven per cent (0.3 units). For one unit of increase in trade with advanced
industrialized countries, the quality of banking reform increases by eleven per cent (0.5 units).
Does enrollment in an IMF program influence the quality of banking reform in the post-
communist region? Participation in the stricter Stand-by Agreement program and participation in
the Poverty Relief and Growth Facility program both register a statistically significant positive
effect on the quality of banking sector reform in post-communist countries, compared to the
baseline category of the dummy variable enrollment in IMF program, which is “no IMF
agreement.”
With respect to the variables that measure economic development, the log of the GDP per
capita is statistically significant and positively associated with the quality of banking sector
reform. For a unit of increase in the log GDP per capita, the quality of banking reform increases16
by seven per cent (0.3 units). The degree to which an economy is agricultural is not a statistically
significant predictor of the quality of banking reform.
The effects of culture, broadly operationalized as the percentage of citizens that have
protestant or muslim religious affiliation, are statistically significant. However, cultural, or in this
case religious, boundaries frequently coincide with regional boundaries. In particular, the Central
European and Baltic front-runners of economic reform have the highest percentages of protestant
population, whereas the Central Asian countries have the highest concentrations of muslim
population. Due to the overlapping regional and cultural cleavages, the culture variables
probably tap into regional effects as much as cultural effects. With that caveat in mind, the
analysis suggests that having a largely protestant population is associated with a higher quality of
banking reform, whereas having a largely muslim population is associated with a lower level of
banking reform. We have to conduct a more careful analysis of what factors within the broad
cultural context drive these results.
Conclusion
This paper started out with the puzzle what factors push governments to pursue good
quality banking sector reform in the post-communist region. I draw on the comparative politics
literature that has analyzed policy outcomes as a result of the interplay of domestic and
international actors. I endorse an agent-driven theoretical framework, assuming that actors such
as the government elites, foreign direct investors, and domestic business associations are the key
factors in the process of policy change. The time series analysis that I conducted confirms the
importance of government coloration and, in particular, the significant difference between
unreformed and reformed left governments in power. Reformed left governments in power are
associated with a better quality of banking sector reform. The analysis also confirms the
expectation that the higher the presence of foreign direct investment in a country and the more a
country trades with advanced industrialized economies, the better the quality of its banking
reform. A limited presence of corruption in the polity is also associated with a higher quality of
banking reform. Participation in the stricter Stand-by agreement program and taking part in the
looser Poverty Relief and Growth Facility program run by the IMF are both associated with a
better quality of banking reform in the post-communist area.17
At the outset, I conceptualized structural factors such as the level of economic
development and intrinsic cultural characteristics as an alternative explanation. The results from
the time series estimation that I conducted suggest that rather than being an alternative
explanation to agent-driven accounts, structural factors play an important complementary role in
the overall explanation of the quality of banking sector reform in the post-communist region. The
structural variables set the broad parameters within which reform takes place. However, the
agency variables become very important when we try to understand what pieces of the domestic
political system are moving during reform.18
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Appendix I: Variables and coding
Variables included in the final model specification
Quality of banking reform
The quality of banking reform variable measures progress in adopting banking regulations such as bankruptcy laws and
guarantees for Central Bank independence. The scale runs from the lowest score (=1) to the highest score (=4.3). Scores
such as 2.3 or 3.7 are possible. The following qualitative description of the scores is taken from the EBRD methodology
report:
1= Little progress beyond establishment of a two-tier banking system.
2= Significant liberalization of interest rates and credit allocation; limited use of directed credit or interest rate
ceilings.
3= Substantial progress in establishment of bank solvency and of a framework for prudential supervision and
regulation; full interest rate liberalisation with little preferential access to cheap refinancing; significant lending to
private enterprises and significant presence of private banks.
4= Significant movement of banking laws and regulations towards BIS (Bank for International Settlements)
standards; well-functioning banking competition and effective prudential supervision; significant term lending to
private enterprises; substantial financial deepening.
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 2005. “EBRD Transition indicators by country.” In
Transition Report 2005: Business in Transition.
Available at: <http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/6520.htm>.
Government coloration
The party in government and its party family (i.e. left, nationalist, liberal/right) are coded using the Armingeon et al.
dataset. The distinction between reformed and unreformed left for the ex-communist parties is established by taking
the year of joining the Socialist International as a switching point.
Source: Armingeon, K. and Careja, R. Comparative Data Set for 28 Post-Communist Countries, 1989-2005,
Institute of Political Science, University of Berne, 2005.
partisan1: Unreformed left in government=1, all other=0
partisan2: Reformed left in government=1, all other=0
partisan3: Liberal/right in government=1, all other=0
partisan4: Nationalist/personalistic party in government=1, all other=0
Domestic alliances
corruption: Lack of corruption
This variable is a composite score based on expert surveys obtained from different organizations. It taps into public
trust in the honesty of politicians; frequency of making extra payments in order to ‘get things done’; percentage of
government officials, judges, and elected leaders involved in corruption.
The scale runs from the lowest score (= –2.5) to the highest score (=2.5)
Source: Danial Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi’s project Governance Matters V.
fdi_pc: Inflow of foreign direct investment per capita
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 2005. “EBRD Transition indicators by country.”
In Transition Report 2005: Business in Transition.
Available at: <http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/6520.htm>.
trade_industrialized: Percentage trade with industrialized countries from the total trade flows.
Source: International Monetary Fund. 1999-2004. Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook. Washington, D.C.:
IMF Publication Services.23
Conditionality
imf1: No IMF agreement=1, all other=0
imf2: Stand-by agreement with IMF=1, all other=0
imf3: Poverty relief and growth facility agreement with IMF=1, all other=0
imf4: No IMF program (and reform front-runner)=1, all other=0
Source: IMF Members’ Financial Data by Country Database.
Available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/exfin1.aspx>.
Economic development
log_gdp_pc: Log GDP (per capita)
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 2005. “EBRD Transition indicators by country.”
In Transition Report 2005: Business in Transition.
Available at: <http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/6520.htm>.
agri: Percentage of GDP from agriculture
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 2005. “EBRD Transition indicators by country.”
In Transition Report 2005: Business in Transition.
Available at: <http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/6520.htm>.
Culture
protestant: Percentage population protestant
Source: The annual editions of the CIA World Factbook
Available at: https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/
muslim: Percentage population muslim
Source: The annual editions of the CIA World Factbook
Available at: https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/
coding refinement: The coding of the EBRD banking reform variable became more nuanced starting 1997.
This is a dummy variable.
1=1997-2005
0=1995 and 1996
Variables excluded from the final model specification
admin: Administrative capacity
The scale runs from the lowest score (= –2.5) to the highest score (=2.5)
Source: Danial Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi’s project Governance Matters V.
judiciary: Judicial capacity
The scale runs from the lowest score (= –2.5) to the highest score (=2.5)
Source: Danial Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi’s project Governance Matters V.
EU conditionality
eu1: No EU conditionality program, but eligible=1, all other=0
eu2: Accession conditionality program=1, all other=0
eu3: Stabilization and Association Agreement program=1, all other=0
eu4: European Neighborhood Policy program=1, all other=0
eu5: No EU conditionality program, and ineligible=1, all other=0
Source: Official website of the European Union: http://europa.eu.org24
Appendix II: Variance inflation factor analysis to detect multicollinearity
Model specification including the administrative and judicial capacity variables and the EU
program participation dummy variables.
Variable | VIF 1/VIF
-------------+----------------------
admin | 16.44 0.060838
log_gdp_pc | 13.73 0.072828
judiciary | 11.27 0.088731
eu2 | 9.07 0.110252
corruption | 7.75 0.128971
eu5 | 5.75 0.173971
imf4 | 5.25 0.190364
partisan1 | 5.18 0.192925
agri | 5.15 0.194249
trade_indu~r | 4.82 0.207389
partisan4 | 3.91 0.255981
imf2 | 3.04 0.329197
imf3 | 2.85 0.350556
muslim | 2.73 0.366556
partisan3 | 2.46 0.406000
eu4 | 2.13 0.469208
eu3 | 2.10 0.476192
fdi_pc | 1.95 0.512313
protestant | 1.93 0.517716
-------------+----------------------
Mean VIF | 5.66
Model specification excluding the administrative and judicial capacity variables and the EU
program participation dummy variables.
Variable | VIF 1/VIF
-------------+----------------------
log_gdp_pc | 9.29 0.107683
corruption | 5.63 0.177649
agri | 4.44 0.225234
imf4 | 3.95 0.253158
partisan1 | 3.86 0.258787
partisan4 | 3.08 0.324326
trade_indu~r | 2.79 0.358714
imf2 | 2.60 0.384668
imf3 | 2.50 0.400183
muslim | 2.22 0.450032
partisan3 | 2.22 0.450449
fdi_pc | 1.85 0.541134
protestant | 1.68 0.596231
-------------+----------------------
Mean VIF | 3.5525
Appendix III: Correlations among the variables in the model
| ebrd_b~g partis~1 partis~2 partis~3 partis~4 corrup~n fdi_pc trade_~r
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------
ebrd_banking | 1.0000
partisan1 | -0.5459 1.0000
partisan2 | 0.4029 -0.3317 1.0000
partisan3 | 0.4382 -0.4762 -0.2808 1.0000
partisan4 | -0.2178 -0.3622 -0.2136 -0.3066 1.0000
corruption | 0.7886 -0.5491 0.3381 0.5338 -0.2632 1.0000
fdi_pc | 0.5752 -0.2884 0.2837 0.2628 -0.2182 0.5348 1.0000
trade_indu~r | 0.6859 -0.4843 0.3715 0.4294 -0.2535 0.6758 0.4088 1.0000
admin | 0.8792 -0.5934 0.4134 0.4900 -0.2294 0.9052 0.5785 0.7171
judiciary | 0.8190 -0.6016 0.3841 0.5423 -0.2520 0.8629 0.4755 0.6787
imf1 | -0.4835 0.4734 -0.1775 -0.2284 -0.1487 -0.3422 -0.1817 -0.3430
imf2 | 0.1010 -0.0314 0.0668 0.0530 -0.0859 -0.0420 -0.1033 -0.0485
imf3 | -0.2192 -0.0284 -0.1534 -0.2255 0.4404 -0.3345 -0.2036 -0.0987
imf4 | 0.5529 -0.3793 0.2401 0.3774 -0.1981 0.7107 0.5026 0.4820
eu1 | -0.6545 0.3138 -0.2461 -0.3154 0.2122 -0.4737 -0.2911 -0.6449
eu2 | 0.6460 -0.4296 0.2761 0.4882 -0.2984 0.6626 0.5090 0.5334
eu3 | 0.1612 -0.1380 0.3054 -0.0716 -0.0366 0.0266 0.0555 0.1012
eu4 | -0.2411 0.3332 -0.2510 -0.2293 0.0937 -0.4194 -0.2019 -0.3434
eu5 | 0.1568 -0.1463 0.0845 0.0658 0.0235 0.1966 -0.0665 0.4041
log_gdp_pc | 0.7798 -0.4075 0.4045 0.4497 -0.4023 0.8203 0.5553 0.6977
agri | -0.6196 0.2890 -0.3002 -0.4024 0.3943 -0.6455 -0.4601 -0.5083
protestant | 0.4636 -0.2726 0.0101 0.4305 -0.1728 0.4589 0.4678 0.3369
muslim | -0.5763 0.3669 -0.2071 -0.3570 0.1584 -0.6179 -0.2736 -0.344026
| admin judici~y imf1 imf2 imf3 imf4 eu1 eu2
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------
admin | 1.0000
judiciary | 0.9085 1.0000
imf1 | -0.4136 -0.4918 1.0000
imf2 | -0.0215 0.0645 -0.3869 1.0000
imf3 | -0.2739 -0.2690 -0.2351 -0.4303 1.0000
imf4 | 0.6918 0.6555 -0.2325 -0.4255 -0.2586 1.0000
eu1 | -0.5645 -0.5459 0.2628 -0.0164 0.0534 -0.2813 1.0000
eu2 | 0.7207 0.6672 -0.2628 -0.0579 -0.3160 0.6365 -0.3438 1.0000
eu3 | 0.0588 -0.0092 -0.0307 0.1771 -0.0941 -0.0930 -0.1023 -0.1137
eu4 | -0.3456 -0.3358 0.1854 -0.1337 0.2740 -0.2870 -0.3158 -0.3507
eu5 | 0.1359 0.1944 -0.1673 0.1440 0.0435 -0.0622 -0.2876 -0.3195
log_gdp_pc | 0.8464 0.7440 -0.2206 0.0112 -0.4489 0.6460 -0.5262 0.6228
agri | -0.6673 -0.6357 0.1403 -0.1264 0.5358 -0.5170 0.4526 -0.5318
protestant | 0.4975 0.4732 -0.1684 0.1294 -0.2185 0.2203 -0.2321 0.3765
muslim | -0.6245 -0.6561 0.2699 -0.2313 0.3771 -0.3510 0.3857 -0.4086
| eu3 eu4 eu5 log_gd~c agri protes~t muslim
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------
eu3 | 1.0000
eu4 | -0.1044 1.0000
eu5 | -0.0951 -0.2934 1.0000
log_gdp_pc | 0.1190 -0.3676 0.2002 1.0000
agri | -0.1078 0.2278 -0.0811 -0.8517 1.0000
protestant | -0.0732 -0.2252 0.0979 0.3698 -0.3643 1.0000
muslim | -0.0291 0.1529 -0.1018 -0.6366 0.5932 -0.2899 1.0000